Case Study of Lebow The Rational Deterrence Theory of War

In each fortune cited, Lebow refers to "'a window of opportunity,' a terminus during which a state possesses a significant soldiery wages over an adversary" (147). It should be noted that Lebow does not develop the Sino-Soviet gaucherie history as extensively as the Germany and Cold War shields to explain his quarrel to judicious deterrence theory.

A main constituent of able deterrence theory as shown in the three case histories, according to Lebow, is that "the aggressive character of the adversary was taken as a given," combined with the presumption that the adversary would continually build up its military capability (154). Lebow's initial objection to the theory of rational deterrence is theoretical, that it "is based on the premise that sex act military advantage is the decisive consideration in a state's finis to go to fight" (149). He says that there are ii contrary theoretical propositions to this idea: "the absolute cost of war in human and economic terms and the personal indisposition of leaders to assume responsibility for it" (149-50). The case histories that Lebow uses suggest that the psychological science of the leaders affects their perception of the "absolute" human and economic cost of war. In other words, the window of opportunity, whether real or im

As a general prevail it may be that the more costly any contemplated abroad policy venture is judged to be, the more important absolute versus relative cost becomes in the minds of policymakers. If so, this calls into question the utility of a cost-gain potassium bitartrate in predicting or explaining decisions with regard to the use of strategic nuclear weapons (157).

Lebow, Richard Ned. "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?" n.p., n.d. 147-86.

The German case is described relative to the historic period 1905-1914 and the adversary relationship of Germany and Russia. During this period Germany was militarily stronger than Russia but refrained from acting. According to the rational deterrence theory, Germany should require moved because of "the calculus of decision as a equivalence of cost and gain, with the rational policymaker moved to adopt the initiative in question to the extent that the gains outweigh the costs" (155). But this did not happen, and for nonrational reasons. Similarly the case in the earliest years of the Cold War, when the US had a significant nuclear advantage over the USSR. Despite the Cold War rhetoric and what could be described as a protracted policy of anticommunist fearmongering somewhat Soviet nuclear capabilities, throughout the 1950s, however, there was no nuclear engagement. The reasons go to the connection between absolute costs and the psychology of leaders. Lebow continues,

agined, is a subsidiary feature of the psychology of military action.

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